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Javad Jamali; Vahid Sinaee
Abstract
IntroductionAt the beginning of the 20th century, Iran and Afghanistan simultaneously started the process of modernization. But despite the civilizational-historical similarities (such as the common language, religion, cultural traditions, monarchy political systems and political culture (, the development ...
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IntroductionAt the beginning of the 20th century, Iran and Afghanistan simultaneously started the process of modernization. But despite the civilizational-historical similarities (such as the common language, religion, cultural traditions, monarchy political systems and political culture (, the development achievements of the two countries were different from each other. In Iran, during Reza Shah Pahlavi's era, state-nation building, modernization of judicial system, creation of communication and industrial infrastructures, administrative-financial modernization, formation of a modern army, and educational and cultural modernization, were carried out in such a way that the face of Iran was completely changed at the end of his 16 - years rule. In Afghanistan, Amanullah Khan (1919 to 1929) started modernization plans in important sections, including state building, drafting the constitution, organizing monetary-financial structures, establishing some industries and workshops, and creating new infrastructures such as schools, media and army. These plans, however, failed and stopped after a decade. Now the question is why, despite the efforts to advance the process of modernization, these two countries faced a different situation in the modernization process and results? Why did Iran achieve levels of modernization during the Pahlavi era, but Amanullah's government failed and collapsed? In Iran, the cooperation of social forces that supported modernization, and the adoption of a successful "survival strategy and survival politics" by the government seems to have restrained social forces that were against modernization. In Afghanistan, however, the lack of social forces supporting modernization and the government's inability to apply a successful survival strategy and politics, caused the failure of modernization process.Materials & MethodsThis research is based on the historical sociology method. Using comparative-historical sociology, this research tries to analyze the socio-historical contexts affecting the modernization process in Iran and Afghanistan, by examining the nature and relationship between the government and society. To compare countries, there are two methods: the method of “difference” (examining similar systems, and selecting their points of difference as the cause of a phenomenon), and the method of “agreement” (examining different systems, and choosing one or more common factors in them as the cause of a phenomenon). In this research, the difference method has been used to compare two countries. The societies of Iran and Afghanistan have been considered to have relatively similar nature and structures, except for the "type of relationship between the government and society"; This difference has been the reason for the success of modernization in Iran and its failure in Afghanistan. According to the historical nature of this research, its data has been collected using documents and books, and in general using library resources. These data have been analyzed using a documentary method, and with a critical attitude.Discussion & ResultTo realize modernization, three key elements play a fundamental role: the state, society (social forces and social classes), and the nature or type of relationship between the state and society. In a state-oriented view, Adrian Leftwich using the “developmental state” concept, considers development in a country to be a function of that country's politics, and emphasizes that economic development has a deeply political nature. According to him, the developmental state has the components of a relative independence from social forces, determined and developmental elites, bureaucratic power, and weak civil society. With a one-sided view of the government's role in the development process, Leftwich considers the civil society as a disturbing and passive element, and emphasizes its weakening. It seems that this part of Leftwich's conceptual structure has some kind of theoretical and experimental deficiency. In the approach of "two-way state-society relations", Joel Migdal in the theory of "state in society" (limited state theory) believes that state and social forces are always in competition, cooperation or conflict with each other. Sometimes one side overcomes or compromises, and sometimes they balance each other's power. This view requires changing the focus of analysis from the state as an independent bureaucratic organization (structural view), to a "process-oriented" view of state in society. This theory is operationalized with the help of social control components, survival strategy and survival policy. Accepting the impact of politics on development and the importance of the centrality of the developmental state, we focus here on the role of social forces supporting modernization and forces allied with the state in this process ـ Contrary to Leftwich, who emphasizes the weakness of civil society as one of the conditions of development.ConclusionBased on the results of this comparative study, it can be said that the will, desire and power of the developmental state alone (in a way that ignores or does not care about the cooperation or opposition of social forces) does not necessarily lead to the success of modernization and development process. In other words, from the perspective of the state-society relations, while the existence of a developmental state as well as the restrain of anti-developmental social forces is a "necessary condition" for advancing development programs, the existence of developmental social forces and their agreement and collaboration with the government is a "sufficient condition" for the realization of development.
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mostafa heidari haratemeh
Abstract
Extended abstractIntroduction: Today, although more foreign products are available to an increasing number of global consumers and more countries seek to increase exports and strengthen their image, but it seems that tensions among countries caused by disputes over territories, economic pressures, sanctions ...
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Extended abstractIntroduction: Today, although more foreign products are available to an increasing number of global consumers and more countries seek to increase exports and strengthen their image, but it seems that tensions among countries caused by disputes over territories, economic pressures, sanctions and religious conflicts have worsened the relations among nations in such a way that, if these disputes are perceived as offensive or unfair, they can cause enmity and increased nationalism, and finally adversely affecting the market. Consumers' anger toward a country that they perceive as an enemy may affect their perception of that country's products and image, and thus negatively impacting the export performance of that product. Consumer nationalism is also part of the attitude that consumers have towards products produced in a foreign country. In other words, customers who have strong ethnic beliefs are more likely to evaluate foreign products negatively than those who do not have such beliefs. As a result, for patriotic reasons, they refrain from buying foreign products even if the quality of the foreign product is superior to their own. Therefore, consumer nationalism has a positive effect on product evaluation (acceptance and belief), but negative effect with consumer hostility. Therefore, the research objective is to investigate the effects of economic hostility and nationalism on international trade. The hypothesis of the research is that economic enmity and nationalism have adverse influence on international trade.Methodology: The current research is a survey type in terms of its practical and descriptive purpose and based on the elements and structures in the literature of the subject, a conceptual framework including a set of propositions is considered. From a structural standpoint, the conceptual model is divided into five categories of construct: 1) Economic hostility, which is caused by the feeling of economic dominance or aggression of the people of a country towards an enemy country which is related to temporary economic events; 2) Consumer nationalism, operationalized in a broader sense that combines consumer nationalism with an eye toward protecting trade, restricting foreign investment, restricting immigration, and restricting foreign companies and intellectual property; 3) The general image of the country, which is defined as a general structure that includes general images created not only by exemplary products, but also by the degree of economic and political maturity, historical events and relationships, culture and traditions, and the degree of virtue and industrialization of technology. It is characterized by a cognitive dimension (related to the level of economic, industrial and technological development) and an emotional dimension (related to emotional characteristics and beliefs towards people); 4) Product-related beliefs, which refer to the judgment and evaluation of specific consumers toward another country's products. 5) Product acceptance, which is defined as a conscious or unconscious readiness to accept external supply systems. The tool used for data collection was a questionnaire and a set of template ideas adapted from previous research. In this regard, a sample of 341 people from a population of 3000 students graduated in the field of economics and commerce was selected by a simple random randomly method and questionnaires were distributed, responses were tabulated, and the data were analyzed using the structural equation technique. Since this sample includes economics and business students, it was assumed that these students have an acceptable knowledge and understanding of financial crises and business economic issues.Results and Discussion: The findings of the research showed that economic hostility towards a foreign country does not have a negative effect on the understanding of the overall image of the country and the beliefs related to the product, but only on the acceptance of the product. Furthermore, economic hostility towards a foreign country has a positive effect on consumer nationalism. On the other hand, nationalism has a negative relationship with belief in the product, but it has no relationship with a negative perception of the country's image. However, higher level of nationalism has a negative effect on product acceptance. A higher level of hostility towards a foreign country does not affect the level of perception of the overall image of the country and the quality of the products made in that country. However, there is a strong and negative relationship between consumer hostility and product acceptance. As a result, consumers with a higher level of economic hostility usually do not welcome more imports from countries that are considered enemies, show a lower level of affinity toward it, and spread little positive words about that country. Finally, economic hostility towards a foreign country can also increase nationalistic feelings and increase the preference for domestic products/services as an expression of their "patriotism".Conclusion: The results of this research are important for economically stronger and weaker countries. It seems that these findings leave no room for doubting that the political and economic actions of a foreign country can affect the feelings of enmity or nationalism of consumers and their images of each other, and in this way affect the purchasing choice of consumers. As a result, companies in countries that are angered by consumers will definitely face many challenges when exporting their products to those countries. In this situation, at least four options can be considered to reduce the potential negative effects of economic hostility on the level of trade in foreign countries where there is consumer hostility. First, during a crisis period, companies can temporarily remove the "made in" label from their advertising campaigns and focus on brand personality effects that are not clearly related to the image of the country of origin or, conversely, bring to mind the image of the same foreign country. Second, companies can use public relations and other communication measures to reduce the perception of "collaboration" with hostile policies and actions and evaluate the opportunity to separate themselves from the policies and actions of their government. Third, cause-related marketing can be used to support non-profit organizations, local communities, and awareness campaigns in affected countries. Fourth, firms can consider investing in foreign countries to develop joint brand strategies with national firms or establish alliances with them to produce hybrid products emphasizing the skills and competencies of local suppliers. Therefore, in order to participate and gain a reasonable share in international trade, policymakers must have a clearer understanding of the possible negative consequences of political and economic actions that are considered offensive or unfair.
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najme sajjadi; Ali Bigdeli
Abstract
Extended abstract IntroductionEfforts to industrialize Iran before the era of Pahlavi II (Mohammad Reza Shah) were conducted outside of any coherent, structured plan and often executed in a directive manner. However, during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, with the formulation of long-term developmental ...
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Extended abstract IntroductionEfforts to industrialize Iran before the era of Pahlavi II (Mohammad Reza Shah) were conducted outside of any coherent, structured plan and often executed in a directive manner. However, during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, with the formulation of long-term developmental plans and the parallel establishment of a planning institution known as the Plan Organization, industrialization for the first time embarked on a pre-designed path. Despite this, the examination of industrial development throughout this period reveals numerous managerial challenges in the process of industrialization. In the early years of Mohammad Reza Shah’s rule, although the government assumed economic and industrial responsibilities in accordance with the constitutional law, officials and politicians lacked deep familiarity with industrial management practices and the evolving nature of industrial management in the West. Consequently, despite the formulation of a comprehensive development plan, placing industrial programs under its umbrella, and creating a planning institution, the absence of a scientifically structured mechanism for industrial management and the undefined scope of responsibilities of those in charge became a point of contention. This contention persisted into later decades as the power of the state diminished and Shah’s involvement in governance increased, leading to significant challenges in managing the country’s industrialization. These challenges sometimes manifested as tensions between the government and technocrats outside the state apparatus, at other times as overt and covert conflicts between members of the government and state agencies, and occasionally as direct confrontations between Shah and the government itself, ultimately hindering the achievement of long-term industrial goals.The present research is aimed at examining these challenges across five distinct periods from 1941 to 1979 and answering the question: what were the managerial challenges during various phases of this era? Studying the trajectory of industrial management between 1941 and 1979, and observing recurring issues and challenges, led to the assertion that industrialization management during this period was never considered independent from political management. Throughout this entire era, industrial development suffered from the absence of an independent and scientific managerial mechanism.The existing body of research on industrial development in Iran can be categorized into three main groups. The first group focuses on the historical timeline of industrial transformations in Iran. Papers such as “A Century of Industrial Change in Iran” and “Examining the Developments of Industry and Industrial Development in Iran” review the historical trajectory of industrial growth in the country (Rahnama 2020: 2-38 and Sharifzadegan 2015: 41-66). The second group examines industrial transformations through the lens of urban and industrial planning. Papers like “Structuring Development in Pahlavi Era Iran”, “Reasons for the Failure of the Development Planning System in Pahlavi II Era”, and the dissertation “The Formation of the Plan and Budget Organization and Its Impact on the Political and Economic Developments of the Pahlavi II Era” analyze industrial transformations within the context of long-term development plans (Kasraei 2023: 218-238, Taleb 2006: 181-204, and Shahvand 2019). The third group investigates the industrial sector as a component of the economic system. Papers like “The Economic Strategy of Pahlavi II” and “Economic Policies of the Pahlavi II Regime Regarding Industry, with an Emphasis on Iran-Germany Relations, 1961-1978” address the challenges facing the industrial sector as intertwined with the broader economic policies of the regime (Nasr 2003: 31-39 and Torabi 2017: 66-78).The distinctive feature of the present study compared to previous works is its focus on analyzing industrialization during the Pahlavi II era from a managerial perspective. MethodologyThe research method employed in this study is descriptive-analytical. The researcher refers to less-utilized library sources, examines existing documents, and extracts historical data. Initially, the process of drafting plans and implementing industrialization programs during the Pahlavi II era by the relevant authorities is described. Subsequently, based on the gathered information, the performance, outcomes, and impacts of their actions are analyzed and evaluated. Discussion and ConclusionThe examination of industrial management challenges across five periods during the Pahlavi II reign reveals that despite structural and institutional changes and the formulation of long-term plans, the management of industrialization continued to follow traditional management mechanisms in Iran. This mechanism was heavily dependent on the interests of the ruling power, and the behavior and motivations of individual politicians and state managers, as well as the political and economic stances of foreign actors. This management system struggled with issues such as individual and unplanned decision-making, overlapping responsibilities among stakeholders, shifting authority, neglect of specialized expertise, preference for short-term gains, and foreign interventions, etc. In such a system, there was significant resistance to delegating managerial authority to experts and non-political figures. Even when such authority was granted, it was temporary and superficial, driven by non-scientific motivations. As these motivations altered, there was a regression to conservative practices, resulting in the withdrawal of responsibilities from experts. Consequently, the formation of an academic and scientific framework for industrial management based on expert thinking was obstructed, hindering progress toward achieving long-term industrial goals.
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Ali Bahranipour; sajad kazemi
Abstract
IntroductionKaramiya sect was one of the most important and influential religious sects during the 3rd to 6th centuries of Hijri. This sect emerged in the 3rd century of Hijri as a branch of the Hanafi religion. They rejected the followers of other religions including Sunni and Shia and other sects. ...
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IntroductionKaramiya sect was one of the most important and influential religious sects during the 3rd to 6th centuries of Hijri. This sect emerged in the 3rd century of Hijri as a branch of the Hanafi religion. They rejected the followers of other religions including Sunni and Shia and other sects. in contrast, Sunni and Shia scholars and even Sufis considered them atheists and infidels because of their beliefs. Here, the aim is not to examine all the existential, theological, jurisprudential, religious and historical dimensions of the Karamiya sect, but only their economic views based on the prohibition of Kasb, as well as the grounds and reasons for changing their views during the Ghaznavid period.Material and MethodsThis research was conducted based on primary sources and some new research related to the method of historical description and analysis.Discussion and ResultsKaramians basically denied "Kasb" and on the other hand, they believed that God is always the provider. In fact, they turned to the “tradition of reliance on Allah" based on a verse from the Qur'an, which means: "Your sustenance is in the sky". But the question here is why the Karamians gradually turned to extortion, collection and confiscation of property despite their Sufi faith and profession and economic austerity. Part of this tendency and practice is related to the social nature of the supporters and followers of this sect. Most of the supporters of this sect were from the low and poor classes of the society, and whenever they got an opportunity, they greedily sought to eliminate hunger. Also, rural farmers and urban artisans and merchants were among their followers, who, contrary to the slogans and propaganda of Karamiya leaders based on "prohibition of Kasb", business and profession were an integral part of their daily lives. Those Karamians who appeared as Sufis and lived in monasteries were not indifferent to earning, but their way of earning and livelihood was apparently based on the tradition of trusting in God. But in practice, relied on the incomes, gifts and offerings of the monasteries. Apart from this, Karamians lacked codified and coherent jurisprudence regarding economic affairs and financial issues. But their rulings, especially in the field of "the sufficiency of verbal confession for faith", "being a hypocrite and hypocrite believer", "the correctness of prayer, fasting and Hajj without intention" and "the correctness of praying with impure clothes" indicate that they do not adhere to It was the principles. In addition, the political opportunity that the Ghaznavid sultans provided to their leaders caused them to theoretically distance themselves from their first views and turn to gaining status and livelihood and confiscating the property of others, especially the Shiites.ConclusionsKaramians basically denied "Kasb". In fact, they turned to the “tradition of reliance on Allah", but given the nature of the different social classes of their followers, including rural farmers and urban artisans, “Kasb” was an integral part of their economic life. Some of their beliefs, such as "verbal faith," can also be interpreted as indicating a generalization of tolerance in other matters, especially tolerance in the field of "Kasb". In addition, the political opportunity that the Ghaznavids provided to the Karamians revealed their desire to acquire and accumulate wealth, especially considering their long-standing enmity with other religious groups, who played a major role in extortion, bribery, and confiscation of others' property.
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Hakimeh Ahmadizadeh Shendi; Reza Shabani; javad Heravi
Abstract
IntroductionThe article "Investigating the reason for naming Merv to Shahigan and the activity of its mint during the Sasanian period" examines a special and important title for the city of Merv during the Sasanian period, under the title of "Shahigan"This title, which appears in Islamic sources as "Shahijan", ...
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IntroductionThe article "Investigating the reason for naming Merv to Shahigan and the activity of its mint during the Sasanian period" examines a special and important title for the city of Merv during the Sasanian period, under the title of "Shahigan"This title, which appears in Islamic sources as "Shahijan", indicates the special importance of Merv during the Sasanian period. Interestingly, this title is not mentioned in any Sasanian inscriptions or coins, but in Manichaean and Pahlavi texts, Shahigan means the palace of the Shah. This probably refers to the existence of a luxurious palace in Merv that the Sasanian emperor used when he was in the eastern regions of the empire. Historical findings such as coins and seals also show that Merv was a very important city since the time of Ardashir Babakan, the founder of the Sassanid dynasty, and her successors. This importance was so great that Merv was the first city that its names was minted on the back of coins, although it was not customary to do so in the early Sasanian period. The present study specifically addresses the issue of why Merv received this special title but was not mentioned in any inscription, what factors made this city of special importance to the Sasanians, and what is the connection between this title and Sasanian coins. Despite extensive research by scholars such as Arthur Christian Sen and Theodor Noldeke on the Sasanian Empire, this issue has not yet been addressed comprehensively and accurately.Materials and methodsIn this article, examines of the numismatic evidence show that Merv minted both gold and silver coins from the very beginning, alongside Ctesiphon. Gobel misreads the Pahlavi name Merv, written as MLWY on the back of Shapur II's coins, as MLKY, which is Shahi. Gobel concludes that Merv must have been a royal city and had the title Shahigan because of its gold minting. In fact, it must be said that Gobel has only come a little close to the essence of the matter and has not reached the true truth of the matter (Altheim et al., 2012: 84). The approach of this historical and numismatic research and the method used are qualitative, descriptive and analytical, and to obtain the required data, Pahlavi texts, Islamic texts, as well as images and contents of books by researchers such as Gyselen (2004, 75), Schindel (2014), Alram (2013: 32), Mochiri (1977), and study of images of seals in Gyselenl's book (2002, 41), Manichaean texts in the Parthian language obtained from the Turfan papers (Boyce, 1975, 84) were used.Discussion and resultsFinally, this research answers key questions about the role of Merv in the Sasanian economy and financial system, as well as the city's connection to gold and silver mints. Examining the title "Shahigan" and its significance can lead us to a better understanding of the strategic and economic position of Merv during the Sasanian and Islamic periods. After examining a Manichaean text and some Islamic texts from the third and fourth centuries AH, it was concluded that the word šāhīgān means the palace of the Shah, which was the residence of the Shah of Iran. Therefore, the existence of a palace at the level of the capital, which was under a royal province, acted as the eastern capital. As Marquardt points out, Merv was the main seat of Iranian government and the seat of the Sassanid ruler. This is why Merv was known as Shahigan because of the presence of the Shahanshah's palace. It now becomes clear why Merv minted gold coins in the early Sassanid era. Merv served as a royal mint and a commercial crossroads, which even issued orders to set up other mints within Merv's borders in times of need, such as war, to provide for the stipends of the soldiers and the money needed. The existence of compound mints with the name Merv such as Merv-Winard and Merv-Rud confirms this.ConclusionAn examination of the title "Shahigan" showed that this title symbolized the special importance of Merv in the political, economic, and financial structure of the Sasanian Empire. The existence of the Shah's Palace and the extensive activity of the mint identify this city as the eastern capital. Furthermore, Merv's strategic location at the crossroads of trade and its key role in minting gold and silver coins further added to its importance during the Sasanian and Islamic periods. A review of historical and numismatic evidence has clearly elucidated Merv's unique role in the financial and economic system of that period.
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Kourosh Fathi; Amir Karimi
Abstract
Extended Abstract
Introduction
Economic history shows that economic changes over time can significantly affect society's social, political and cultural structures. For example, the Industrial Revolution, which led to significant changes in the methods of production and distribution of wealth, also ...
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Extended Abstract
Introduction
Economic history shows that economic changes over time can significantly affect society's social, political and cultural structures. For example, the Industrial Revolution, which led to significant changes in the methods of production and distribution of wealth, also affected the formation of social classes and political structures. Also, economic history helps us identify economic growth and recession patterns and better understand their causes and consequences. Financial history is a branch of history that was less studied before the 20th century, but in recent years it has been noticed by researchers. Therefore, it is necessary to carry out scientometric research for a better and more systematic understanding of the research in this field.
Meanwhile, scientometric research in economic history is valuable for several reasons: It provides a comprehensive and objective analysis of the intellectual landscape and identifies key researchers, institutions, and countries contributing to the field. In addition, this type of research helps a lot in understanding the trends, patterns, and dynamics of historical economic research. The scientometric analysis enables the evaluation of research impact, identification of impact and importance of specific articles, authors, or research journals, identification of research gaps, and future research trends by analyzing existing literature and areas with limited or no research. It also enables researchers to foster collaborations, promote interdisciplinary research, help track research trends and emerging topics, and identify evolving research clusters, hot topics, and emerging research topics, leading to improved research results and informed decision-making. In this regard, leading research aims to analyze and illustrate scientific productions in economic history. Similar efforts have been made in the history of Iran, including the book Economic and Social History of Iran and Iranians by Adnan Mazhari (1969), which includes the economic history of early civilizations, ancient Iran, the Sassanids, Macedonian and Greek periods, Eastern Iranians and Parthians, the Arab world. Islam consists of the return to civilization, the dominance of the Turks and Tatars, and the Safavid era. The book "Economic History of Iran" by Charles Esei (1983) deals with topics such as social construction, internal trade, transportation, agriculture, industry, oil, and finance in the history of Iran. The book Owner and Farmer in Iran, written by Lambton (2014), emphasizes the critical role of village interaction in determining the stability and income of the government and includes the history of income management and property ownership from Islam to today. Petroshevski and his colleagues (1987), in the book Socio-Economic History of Iran in the Mughal Period, narrates the rise and fall of Iran's social and economic situation during the Ilkhanate and Mongol periods. The work of Yervand Abrahamian (2022) with the title has a completely scientific approach to the economy of contemporary Iranian history, which is manifested in attention to economic factors, the working class, economic imbalance, and statistical and documented analysis of economic policies. Among the researchers, Dehnad and Jamkarani (2022), in a study on the evolution of financial literacy and financial behavior, concluded that initially, researchers focused on demographic and socio-economic factors. However, this field later expanded, covering topics such as behavioral and psychological constructs that influence financial behavior.
Materials & Methods
The research method is scientometric and is done with Excel and VOS Viewer software. The statistical population of the research was 6514 scientific articles from Science Direct scientific database between 1999 and 2023, which were extracted and analyzed. After entering the data from the scientific database into the software, 418 nodes, 11 clusters, and 3284 links were identified by repeating 8 times.
Discussion & Result
The research results show that The trend of publication of articles is upward among journals, research in economic history, and among the words economic growth, economic history, innovation, institutions, economic development, growth, human capital, and immigration are top in terms of repetition. The categories of economic growth, development, institution, regulations, profitability, and the business cycle are topics that, despite being very popular, are no longer as necessary in this trend as in the last decade, and the categories of monetary policies, energy, mining, natural resources, government capacity, and Covid- 19 were among the hottest categories.
Conclusion
In response to the first question of the research, a scientific map of the field of economic history was drawn, and based on the findings of the study, economic growth, economic history, innovation, institutions, economic development, growth, human capital, and immigration have been very popular among historians.
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Mohammadsalar kasraie; Behzaad Asghari
Abstract
IntroductionThe concept of development and development planning is an issue that has become a problem of the Iranian society in the contemporary era. Therefore, many have studied and criticized this concept, ideas and development plans prepared in Iran. The authors of this research have previously evaluated ...
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IntroductionThe concept of development and development planning is an issue that has become a problem of the Iranian society in the contemporary era. Therefore, many have studied and criticized this concept, ideas and development plans prepared in Iran. The authors of this research have previously evaluated and investigated the development plans in the second Pahlavi era in a research titled "Construction of Development Plans in Iran before the Islamic Revolution". The present research, which deals with the construction of development plans after the Islamic revolution, in continuation of the same research with the approach of historical sociology and the theoretical model of construction, seeks an answer to how the development plans are formulated after the Islamic revolution.Materials & MethodsHistorical sociology investigates the evolution of social structures and processes, therefore, in a sense, it pays attention to the development of societies and examines the theoretical and practical aspects of the phenomena of human society in a historical context and in a long-term process. This research uses this approach to formulate the planning process. Development in Iran will benefit after the Islamic Revolution. Most of the studies conducted in this field have been limited to one of these aspects or have not examined this phenomenon in a historical context and in a comprehensive process. In terms of the theoretical approach, in this article, the construction theory will be used as an epistemic platform for data processing. The theoretical approach of construction is considered a unified theoretical model and connects two levels of society, micro and macro, so in this approach, social phenomena are created in the interrelationship of structure-actor/agent and are reproduced in a dialectical and dynamic relationship in the historical context of structures.Discussion & ResultThe concept of development, after the Islamic revolution, with the interruption that occurred in its implementation, unlike the experience before the revolution, faced a different worldview, which made the development process face a new problem, and that was the lack of attention to the different foundations of these two phenomena. Therefore, regardless of the coordination of the theoretical basis of these two phenomena, the development process faced serious problems. The effort to align the ideals of the revolution and the theoretical ideas of development was something that was not paid much attention to at first, and this itself became a factor for the internal and external contradictions of this phenomenon. The different approaches of different governments to build the concept of development based on new ideals was another factor that did not help the theoretical construction of this phenomenon. The change of governments in the middle of implementing the programs also prevented the coherence of this phenomenon in the experience after the revolution. In addition to that, the interference of the compiled development plans with the upstream documents made it impossible to construct this phenomenon. This resulted in the formation of an intellectual consensus about the concept and format of development after the revolution and, except for the third program prepared and implemented in the reform government, a coherent thinking environment for development programs was not formed.In the domain of activists, the development plans after the Islamic revolution faced fundamental challenges. As the conflict between governments and parliaments over the approval and implementation of post-revolution development plans and various government departments with each other, often led to a lack of elite consensus on development plans and even led to non-implementation by governments and their complete negation. As sometimes the development plans have been extended due to these differences and non-approval at the appointed time. Activists of development programs sometimes faced the problem of the possibility of forming this concept by completely denying the planning path in practice.ConclusionIn the course of history, the developed development plans were faced with events during the implementation phase that made it impossible to form these plans. The most important feature of the development programs after the Islamic revolution, unlike the pre-revolution era, is the budget deficit due to the dependence of the budget on oil and various sanctions since the beginning of the Islamic revolution, which did not provide the possibility of its coherent construction. This has made it impossible to achieve the goals of the development plans and has caused deviations from the plans. Sanctions on Iran and its social, political and economic results have practically made the necessary platform for the implementation and formation of development plans impossible. In other words, for a long time, sanctions have prevented the use of elite capacities, financing, technological supply, etc., and on the other hand, by creating crises and social and economic gaps, it has challenged the development plans. Therefore, the development plans in Iran after the revolution have not been able to be constructed and have remained in the form of ideas and thoughts.
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ghasem khorami
Abstract
Introduction:efforts toward industrialization in Iran and the establishment of factory-based production began during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah Qajar (1848–1896). However, initiatives such as mineral exploration and extraction, the creation of military and civilian industrial units, and investments ...
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Introduction:efforts toward industrialization in Iran and the establishment of factory-based production began during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah Qajar (1848–1896). However, initiatives such as mineral exploration and extraction, the creation of military and civilian industrial units, and investments from state, private, and foreign sources failed to catalyze meaningful industrialization or increase the industrial sector’s share of the national economy. The total number of factories established during this period did not exceed 60, employing fewer than 2,000 skilled and semi-skilled industrial workers. These factories, constrained by small scale, limited production capacity, rudimentary technology, and minimal employment, mostly went bankrupt or ceased operations by the end of the Qajar period. As a result, one of the most critical historical opportunities for Iran’s industrialization was lost. Why did Iran, which initiated industrialization in the mid-19th century alongside countries such as Germany, Japan, and the United States, fail to achieve it? Addressing this question offers valuable insights into the causes of Iran’s subsequent economic underdevelopment.The reasons for industrial and economic underdevelopment during Naser al-Din Shah’s reign have been studied from two primary perspectives: external and internal. Some researchers such as Ahmad Ashraf, Farhad Nomani and Jan Foran attribute the failure to external factors, including the 19th-century international system’s structural constraints. These include the imposition of agricultural policies, the promotion of brokerage activities, and the influx of foreign capital and goods, which undermined domestic production. Others Like Charles Issawi, Yakup Polak and Hoshang Amir Ahmadi emphasize internal factors such as unfavorable geography, the lack of transportation infrastructure, insufficient capital accumulation, the absence of skilled domestic specialists, autocratic governance, and even the personality and leadership style of Naser al-Din Shah. However, these studies have largely neglected the role of interactions and reciprocal relationships between the state and society in shaping industrial development or stagnation. This article does not entirely dismiss the impact of external factors—particularly the influx of foreign goods with low tariffs on the decline of traditional industries and the weakening of Iran’s nascent industrial sector—but argues that these challenges were not unique to Iran. Many countries pursuing industrialization in the 19th century, such as the United States, Germany, Japan, and Russia, faced similar pressures from British imports. Even nations like India, Canada, and South Africa, which underwent early industrialization under British colonial rule, managed to overcome unequal trade conditions and other significant obstacles.Materials & Methods:The article explains the failure of industrial development during the Naseri era by examining the relationship between the government and productive forces, employing documentary and library-based research methods within an institutional framework, specifically Frederick List’s National Economy model. "Productive forces" in this context refers to landowners, merchants, and industrialists, who are collectively categorized as social forces. The study argues that beyond external pressures, a combination of interconnected internal factors created conditions that hindered the Qajar state’s ability to overcome developmental constraints. According to List’s framework, 19th-century industrializing nations required strong cooperation between the state and productive forces, prioritizing the industrial sector and regulating foreign trade to strengthen national productive capacity.In contrast, during the Qajar era, industrialization efforts were challenged at both state and societal levels.Discussion & Result:Unlike the prudent, development-oriented governments envisioned by List—those that promoted investment security, infrastructure development, workforce training, industrial support, and foreign trade regulation to enhance citizens’ well-being—the Qajar state under Naser al-Din Shah failed to establish property rights, reform productive and economic systems, or facilitate the emergence of a modern industrial society. Instead, the government relied on extortion, plunder, excessive taxation, concessions to foreign powers, property confiscation, and the direct consumption of societal surpluses, becoming a major obstacle to national production and the growth of domestic industries.While the Qajar government exhibited some interest in defensive modernization and military industries, it lacked a comprehensive understanding of the industrial transformations occurring in the West. This disconnect left society uninformed about the state’s intentions regarding economic and industrial development. The breakdown in state-society relations, coupled with the absence of a clear strategy for engaging with foreign capital and goods, exacerbated tensions among social forces, including intellectuals, clergy, and productive groups such as landowners, merchants, and industrialists. Intellectual elites veered between extreme admiration for and opposition to the West, often marginalizing domestic merchants and failing to cultivate a developmental culture or movement. Meanwhile, landowners and merchants—who, according to List, should have partnered with industrial bourgeoisie and reinvested agricultural surpluses into productive sectors—prioritized short-term profits from export-oriented farming and foreign trade over long-term national interests. Consequently, the productive capacity necessary for sustaining and expanding nascent domestic industries never materialized.ConclusionThe failure of Naser al-Din Shah’s industrial modernization efforts left Iran’s economy vulnerable to global markets and paved the way for social unrest and political crises, culminating in the Constitutional Revolution. To this day, the question of how to effectively support domestic industries and strengthen national productive capacity And, of course, the ability to innovate and be competitive remains a fundamental issue for Iran’s economy. Therefore, it is suggested that while communicating and interacting with the global economy, strengthening the national production base as a joint project of the government and the society should continue to be at the top of the country's policymakers' priorities.
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saideh torab; Hasan Hazrati; mohsen seraj
Abstract
IntroductionIran's port and maritime facilities located along the coasts of Khuzestan and Bushehr, including Imam Khomeini Port, Mahshahr, and Khark Island, as well as the maritime route and Iran's vital economic lifeline—the Strait of Hormuz—were considered the most sensitive economic and ...
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IntroductionIran's port and maritime facilities located along the coasts of Khuzestan and Bushehr, including Imam Khomeini Port, Mahshahr, and Khark Island, as well as the maritime route and Iran's vital economic lifeline—the Strait of Hormuz—were considered the most sensitive economic and communication zones during this period. Ensuring the security of these areas was so critical that it could be seen as another front against Iraq's escalating aggressions. As the war dragged on, the need for both parties to sustain oil exports grew more urgent. Iran was fully aware of the importance of oil revenues and sought to maintain and even increase oil exports through terminals on Lavan and Siri Islands. However, Iraq imposed significant pressures to cut off Iran's oil exports, aiming to force Iranian authorities into negotiations. These pressures were so intense that Iran's oil export terminal on Khark Island was temporarily unable to operate. Iraq's military disruptions severely impacted Iran's oil exports, making Iranian ports and shipping routes appear unsafe. Nevertheless, meeting wartime needs and covering war expenses were entirely dependent on the continued operation of ports and the restoration of maritime traffic to Iranian waters. The Ports and Maritime Organization (PMO), as the primary authority responsible for maritime transportation and safety, held full jurisdiction over all port and maritime affairs in the country. The organization's fleet had the necessary capabilities to fulfill a significant portion of operational and logistical maritime needs. Therefore, it became necessary for the PMO, in compliance with new directives issued by the armed forces, to implement structural changes and, based on wartime requirements, to allocate its fleet as well as its technical and specialized capabilities to support the war effort. This process required extensive coordination and even alterations to the organization’s usual operations and structure. Hence, questions arose regarding the reasons and methods for this collaboration, the quality of interaction between the PMO and the military forces, and the nature of adaptive changes within the organization’s responsibilities. Although the PMO continued to perform its primary role as the main authority managing maritime transportation, the crisis of war introduced new imperatives that required reexamining the legal roles and responsibilities of the PMO as well as the scope of adaptive changes in its wartime performance. Historical evidence underscores the crucial role of logistics in wars. Alongside other civilian maritime organizations, the PMO was obligated to meet the logistical demands of the war, although its interactions with the armed forces differed significantly. This study aims to identify and analyze the level of integration and coordination between various components of the PMO and other institutions involved in the war effort.Materials & MethodsThe approach of this study is grounded in data and based on the description and critical analysis of documents and records. Consequently, the method employed is archival and document-based. Additionally, the oral history of the Iran-Iraq War contains significant material relevant to the subject, including memoirs and interviews, which have been utilized as much as possible. One of the most important sources for this research is the extensive collections published by institutions directly involved in the war, such as the Ports and Maritime Organization, the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and later, the Navy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. These publications provide valuable insights into the roles and operations of these institutions during the war and reveal many untold aspects of the conflict. Furthermore, many directives and meeting minutes issued by these institutions during the war, included as official documents in these collections, are critical for identifying various dimensions of the maritime conflict. These documents offer the opportunity to examine some of the most significant events of the Iran-Iraq War in the Persian Gulf from the perspective of the involved institutions and analyze their actions and performance during the conflict.Discussion & Result The role of both Iran and Iraq as key producers and exporters of oil in the Persian Gulf turned the region into a second front, equally as critical as the land battles for both sides. Success in this domain meant superiority in oil production and export, thereby exerting pressure on the adversary. Oil revenues played a pivotal role in meeting the war's needs, significantly influencing domestic markets and fulfilling the population's requirements. Additionally, any disruption in maritime traffic would result in the rerouting of commercial and oil tankers elsewhere. For Iran, ensuring security along these routes was crucial to not only maintaining but also increasing the free flow of ships to Iranian ports and terminals in the Persian Gulf. To improve coordination with the country’s military and security institutions, the Ports and Maritime Organization of Iran established an operational headquarters during this period. The purpose of this headquarters was to manage crises at southern ports and ensure the continuity of ship traffic to Iranian ports. Subsequently, on October 10, 1980 (18 Mehr 1359), an emergency plan for controlling maritime traffic in the Persian Gulf was developed and issued by the Army’s 421st Combat Unit to manage crises and ensure the continuation of maritime activity. Another critical issue was creating suitable conditions for the free movement of ships. For shipowners, the duration of port stays was a determining factor. Additionally, a high number of waiting ships at ports not only caused doubts about the efficiency and organization of the ports but also required substantial compensation for shipowners for each additional day of docking. This issue was frequently observed at Iranian docks in the early stages of the war. Thus, a shared area of cooperation between military and civilian maritime organizations emerged: addressing these problems using the equipment, expertise, and skills of institutions such as the Ports and Maritime Organization, which could significantly mitigate such challenges.For instance, during 1980-1981, due to the increased volume of ships at Abbas and Bushehr ports, the Ports and Maritime Organization was tasked with extending working hours for its personnel and implementing special scheduling for the entry and exit of ships and fishing boats. This allowed maximum utilization of loading and unloading capacities. Similarly, during military operations and construction projects necessary for the armed forces, the Ports and Maritime Organization played a vital role based on its experience and expertise. Many operational and logistical needs of the armed forces during major operations, such as the lifting of the Abadan siege, Martyr Safari, Ashkan, Morvarid, the reintegration of Imam Khomeini Port into maritime transportation, the emergency escort plan for convoys in the Persian Gulf, and countering growing threats to Iran’s largest oil terminal on Kharg Island, were met and delivered with the collaboration of institutions like the Ports and Maritime Organization. Iran’s interests rested on maintaining stability and ensuring the continuity of oil exports. At the same time, it was widely believed that targeting Iran’s oil facilities could weaken its military capabilities in two ways: first, by reducing military equipment and arms, and second, by creating economic difficulties for institutions and the populace. Given the significance of this matter, wherever discussions of wartime logistics and meeting operational needs arise, the presence of the Ports and Maritime Organization is invariably evident.Conclusion The historiography of the Iran-Iraq War, compared to the broader historiography of contemporary Iranian history, represents a distinct and unique phenomenon. However, this very distinctiveness exposes it to several vulnerabilities. The diverse interpretations of the war have made uncovering the truth behind many events challenging, particularly as the war is so deeply intertwined with the Islamic Revolution that discussing the historiography of the war becomes a complex task. Numerous centers have been established under the banner of war studies or research, each focusing on analyzing operational or tactical war documents within their respective objectives. It is evident that achieving these goals is impossible without creating archives and collecting comprehensive war-related documents. However, while many strategic war documents remain unpublished, the limited available documents are often unprofessionally archived within these institutions. In some cases, no steps have been taken for their cataloging or review. As a result, despite nominal access, these collections are practically inaccessible to researchers and students. The proliferation of institutions claiming expertise in war historiography has led to a form of competition centered solely on hoarding documents, a phenomenon that can be described as "document monopoly." In a few cases, institutions involved in the Iran-Iraq War, such as the Ports and Maritime Organization, have systematically collected, identified, and reviewed relevant documents, producing highly comprehensive collections. However, even in these rare instances, the archives remain closed to researchers, with access to existing documents still restricted. These archives are only used for certain internal research projects. Thus, monopolization stands as one of the biggest obstacles to war historiography, making any critical research in various aspects of the war nearly impossible. As mentioned earlier, the multiplicity of narratives about the war, coupled with the entanglement of the war and the Islamic Revolution, has made providing straightforward, realistic, and unaltered accounts extremely difficult. The perspective that views the war and defense as sacred rather than political further complicates war historiography, as it makes any critical or impartial evaluation nearly impossible. This issue has placed the writing of war history under the monopoly and dominance of specific institutions. As a result, this research has not been immune to these challenges. Despite the central role of the Ports and Maritime Organization in this study, none of the documents and records in its archives were accessible. Consequently, alongside the limited research conducted on the history of ports and maritime affairs, the work was carried out by exploring collections such as the National Archives, the Center for War Studies and Research affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Organization for Sacred Defense Documentation and Records. However, the available documents in these centers were insufficient in quantity to meet the research needs, especially since, contrary to standard practices, no documents from the Ports and Maritime Organization had been transferred to the National Archives. To address this gap, an attempt was made to compensate by using regulations, directives, correspondence, and joint negotiations between institutions. Additionally, chronologies and calendars compiled by the Army and the IRGC proved helpful in this regard. Based on the collected information, the historical developments, the background of the Ports and Maritime Organization, and the specific crises it faced during the war-which necessitated structural changes and the adoption of new exigencies-were described
.
مهدی احمدی
Abstract
1.IntroductionStatement of the subject: During the Qajar period, especially during the reign of Nasser al-Din Shah, a large part of the Iranian workforce, under the influence of internal conditions and the situation in the Caucasus, legally and illegally left the borders and migrated to these regions. ...
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1.IntroductionStatement of the subject: During the Qajar period, especially during the reign of Nasser al-Din Shah, a large part of the Iranian workforce, under the influence of internal conditions and the situation in the Caucasus, legally and illegally left the borders and migrated to these regions. Most of these people were from the provinces of Azerbaijan, Khorasan, Gilan, Mazandan, and cities such as Zanjan and Hamedan, who had a different status from others in terms of class existence; that is, the type of access to various sources of power (material capital, organizational authority, and knowledge and skills with exchange value in the labor market). These immigrants included landless and land-owning peasants, the urban poor, craftsmen who worked in workshops and handicrafts, and a number of small merchants and artisans who lived in cities and villages but migrated to the Caucasus as a result of social, economic, and political conditions.Statement of the problem: From the late 19th century to the early 20th century, the Iranian workforce in the Caucasus went through different lived experiences than they had in Iran, one of the most important of which was in the field of their type of employment, working hours, and wages. The main issue of the present study is the relationship between the class existence of the Iranian workforce in the Caucasus and their job status, working hours, and wages.Objective: The objective of the present article is to analyze the lived experience of Iranian migrant workers in the fields of employment, working hours, and wages.Questions:In what sectors were the Iranian workforce employed in the Caucasus? And given the occupation situation in the Caucasus, what was the status of their working hours and wages?Hypotheses: The class existence of Iranian migrants was in a cause-and-effect relationship with their lived experience; That is, due to the type of class existence (lack of material capital, means of production, and knowledge and skills) that they had, the Iranian workforce mostly worked more than 12 hours as workers in the oil industry, mines, agriculture, docks, etc., but they were at the lowest level in terms of financial income. In this way, depending on the type of work they did, they received an average of between 12 and 21 rubles, some of which was reduced for fines and bribes.Research Background: Hassan Hakimian (1995), Touraj Atabaki (2017), Seyyed Hashem Aghajari, Mehdi Ahmadi and Dariush Rahmanian (February 1402) and Omrieh Ahadeva, Qobad Mansurbakht and Karim Karaikoglu Shekorov (Summer 1402) have written articles on the Iranian workforce in the Caucasus. In these articles, researchers have covered aspects of the social and cultural life of immigrants while addressing the issue of migration, but have not addressed the issue of employment, working hours, and wages. In light of this, the present article, in addition to paying attention to the employment status, working hours, and financial income of the Iranian workforce, attempts to determine the relationship between class existence and their lived experience using a bottom-up approach to history and inspired by Thompson's methodology.2.Materials & MethodsThe present article is written with a "history from below" approach and inspired by the methodology of Edward Palmer Thompson in his book "The Formation of the Working Class in England" and collecting data from archival sources. This article has set its target population as all Iranians who migrated to the South Caucasus regions from the late 19th to the early 20th centuries and were known as workers in the oil industry, mines, agriculture, docks, etc.Discussion & Result FindingsType of employment of Iranian immigrants in the Caucasus: Iranian labor force, known in the Caucasus as Fele and Emel, performed various jobs such as drilling, well drilling, portering, serving, serving, building, trading, selling opium, hoisting, selling coal, etc.Working hours of Iranian labor force: The working hours of workers were not less than 12 hours. In some places, workers were even forced to work between 12 and 20 hours and in two shifts.Salary of Iranian workers: Iranian workers in the South Caucasus received a monthly salary of 12 to 21 rubles, depending on the type of work they did.Discussion and ConclusionWhen the Iranian labor force migrated to the Caucasus, they did not have material capital and means of production, nor did they have technical knowledge and skills. They did jobs such as drilling, well drilling, portering, serving, serving, building, trading, selling opium, hoisting, selling coal, etc. Due to the lack of necessary skills and poverty and hardship, they were willing to do any kind of work for more than 12 hours and even two shifts throughout the day, but they received lower wages than Russian, Georgian, Armenian and even local workers, and part of these wages were reduced as a result of fines and bribes that they had to pay. In this way, Iranian workers received a monthly wage of 12 to 21 rubles (depending on the type of work they did) for 12 hours of daily work and even more.Iranian migrant workers, regardless of their job and wage level, were in a brutal relationship of open and hidden exploitation with their employers; This means that employers practically tried their best to hire more workers with lower wages. Therefore, they usually adhered to the law less in hiring workers and their wages and acted as they saw fit. Overtime, fines, bribes and firing workers under various pretexts and illegally were common, and workers had no right to protest because they were suppressed or fired by the employers and sometimes by the government.It is suggested that such research be considered in the industrial sector and labor society because in terms of effectiveness, paying attention to wages, working hours and the standard of living of workers, which is discussed in this research, is effective as a historical example in their decision-making and can reduce the level of tension in workplaces.
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ashkan gholami; abdorrafi rahimi
Abstract
Introduction In the Middle Ages, the importance and impact of political, religious, and economic developments dominated other aspects of Iranian society. In these circumstances, the local-regional economic approach is very useful in better and more accurate identification of the historical ...
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Introduction In the Middle Ages, the importance and impact of political, religious, and economic developments dominated other aspects of Iranian society. In these circumstances, the local-regional economic approach is very useful in better and more accurate identification of the historical space of different regions in the period under discussion. According to this principle, in the Middle Ages, some regions were of interest to the centers of power due to their geographical-strategic location and natural talents. In the meantime, Isfahan, with such characteristics, was always in the turmoil of various events, and various aspects of the life of the people of this land, including the economic situation, underwent changes under the influence of the surrounding historical developments. Considering that, from the perspective of the researchers of the present study, the mentioned developments were closely related to the political governments of the time, it can be claimed that by examining the approaches and policies of the governments of the time, which claimed to be Muslim and some of their actions were influenced by the teachings of this religion, a better explanation can be given of the changes and developments that occurred in the economic sphere of this region. The role of government in the geographical area of Isfahan is strengthened when the historical position and economic importance of this region doubled during the Buyid and Seljuk periods, which also served as the capital for a while. The question raised in this study is what was the impact of the economic-religious policies of the Buyid and Seljuk dynasties on the economy of Isfahan (a case study of exports) and what were the points of commonality and difference between the two periods? Materials & MethodsIn a descriptive-analytical method and based on library resources Discussion & Result According to geographers (in the early Buyid period), Isfahan was located on the communication and economic routes: “It is the gateway to Fars, the mountains, Khorasan, and Khuzestan” (Jihani, 1368: 141). “Isfahan is supposedly Pars, Khuzestan, Khorasan, and Khuzestan” (Istakhri, 1346: 164 and 165). Such natural conditions could have led to the movement of trade caravans and improved the economic situation of Isfahan. However, in the early period of the Buyid rule, the land of Isfahan was the scene of numerous political and military conflicts between this dynasty and various political rivals such as the Samanids in Khorasan (Ibn Athir, 1382, vol. 11: pp. 4867, 4894, and 4913, and also Moskvai, 1376, vol. 5: 480). On the other hand, Isfahan’s neighbors were also involved in political and military turmoil. For example, the Buyid attack on Kerman in 324 (ibid., vol. 11: 4878 and 4879) or the Buyid attack on Rey and the capture of this land in 329 AH (ibid., vol. 11: 4920 and 4921). On the other hand, destructive natural disasters also occurred in Isfahan during the early Buyid period. For example, in 323 and early 324 AH, a severe famine spread among the people of Isfahan. This became so severe that 200,000 people were killed in the two cities of Isfahan, Yehudiyeh and Shahrestan (Isfahani, 1346: 179). Such natural disasters could have caused famine and destroyed economic security. All these conditions together could have caused economic stagnation and a decrease in Isfahan's exports, however, according to evidence, the early Buyid rulers, who had some economic intuition, made economic decisions in such a situation that led to the economic growth of this land. The evidence for this is the reports of Isfahan, who wrote his book in the early Buyid period. According to his account, "silk societies and fine canvases arose from Isfahan. They carried around the country... the fruits of Sepahan were widely distributed" (Isfahan, 1346: 165). Another evidence for the economic growth of Isfahan is the expansion of some areas of this land and the prosperity of agriculture in them. Conclusion The findings of the research indicate that in the first period of the Buyid and Seljuk governments, despite political-military conflicts and the occurrence of destructive natural disasters in Isfahan, due to the economic intuition of the first rulers of these two dynasties, plans were implemented to improve the economic situation and exports of this land, which included strengthening the means of transportation or changing trade routes or reducing taxes. During the peak of their power, the Buyid sultans provided the necessary infrastructure for the prosperity of Isfahan's exports by implementing measures such as suppressing bandits and building reservoirs and warehouses. The result of implementing these measures was the export of various products produced in this land to distant places. During the period of political decline of the Buyid and Seljuk governments, the rulers of the Buyid dynasty continued to pay special attention to protecting the interests of various economic groups. During part of the Seljuk government, due to the actions of sultans such as Sultan Muhammad, the economic situation was somewhat prosperous and Isfahan's products were exported to other regions, but after the death of Sultan Muhammad, the occurrence of severe political-military conflicts and destructive natural disasters caused the decline of Isfahan's economic life and its export flow to be interrupted. During the political collapse, Isfahan and other parts of Iran were the scene of various political conflicts and suffered severe damage from these aspects. In these circumstances, the economic situation of this land was severely in crisis and its export flow to other regions was cut off.
.
azam Riahi
Abstract
Extended abstractIntroduction: Zoorabad Jam is a border region in eastern Khorasan characterized by a relatively low-lying plain situated between two rivers and flanked by two mountain ranges, sharing a border with Afghanistan. Historically, the movement of people between the two countries has been facilitated ...
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Extended abstractIntroduction: Zoorabad Jam is a border region in eastern Khorasan characterized by a relatively low-lying plain situated between two rivers and flanked by two mountain ranges, sharing a border with Afghanistan. Historically, the movement of people between the two countries has been facilitated through this border area. However, existing documents indicate widespread migration (both forced and voluntary) of the inhabitants of the Zoorabad border region during the First Pahlavi era. This migration occurred shortly after the commencement of the Pahlavi government's reform measures regarding the settlement of nomads. The implementation of this policy significantly affected the security of this border region, as it diminished the role of nomads as military forces responsible for safeguarding the borders. Previously, the nomads were under the authority of khans and local powers, naturally fulfilling a protective function for the borders. Meanwhile, the government was unable to replace them with an adequate military force to protect this segment of the border. There were few border outposts in these areas, which lacked the capacity to withstand incursions from Afghan nomads. The assaults from Afghan tribes under Afghan rule against Iranian borders increased. Ultimately, the Afghan attack on Zoorabad in the northern border region of Iran and the ensuing Zoorabad incident exacerbated the situation. In 1313H (1934 AD), approximately 2,000 members of the Baluch, Noorzaei, Zoori, and Timur tribes, residing along the Iran-Afghanistan border, were forced to migrate into Afghanistan following the Afghan incursions into Zoorabad. Migration represents a two-fold phenomenon and carries both positive and negative repercussions for both the destination and origin of the migratory flows. The emigration of the local population and the depopulation of the Zoorabad region also brought social, economic, cultural, and other implications. As evidenced by documents and records, the migration (both forced and voluntary) of the area's indigenous residents following the invasion of border tribes from Afghanistan into Iran and the emergence of the Zoorabad incident led to the depopulation of numerous villages and farms. Given the geopolitical location of the region as a disputed border area between Iran and Afghanistan, maintaining the human population and agricultural activity was crucial for establishing Iranian political sovereignty over the region. Otherwise, the likelihood of a shift in the region's demographic composition and Afghan claims of sovereignty would have increased. Therefore, this article aims to address the conditions of farms and properties in the region after the migration of native residents and answer the question: what measures did the government take to manage and utilize the abandoned properties and agricultural lands in Zurabad?Materials & Methods: The methodology employed in this article is descriptive-analytical, examining existing archival and library sources related to the topic. Additionally, given the breadth of the subject of migration and its repercussions, this article specifically addresses one of the consequences of migration at its origin to avoid generalizations. Hence, the outline first describes the geographical and demographic status of the area in question, discusses the reasons behind the Zoorabad incident and its consequences, and then examines the government's measures for managing the abandoned properties of migrants and supplying a workforce. The community under investigation comprises the properties of migrants who relocated from Zoorabad to Afghanistan between 1313 H and 1320 H (1934-1941 AD).Discussion & Result:The available data indicate that the migration (both forced and voluntary) of the local inhabitants in the wake of the Zoorabad incident led to the depopulation of villages and farms. Considering its geographical position as a border region with longstanding disputes with the neighboring country, it was vital to maintain the human population as well as the agricultural sector in order to stabilize Iran’s political sovereignty over the area. Consequently, the government attempted to address this issue through supportive measures, such as resettling eastern tribes (the Barabari Afghans), leasing confiscated properties, and other strategies. However, the lack of motivation among the labor force and the resulting temporary settlement in this area, along with migration to other regions, rendered the government’s efforts ineffective. Finally, the government sought to organize the situation in the region by leasing properties to agricultural companies and resolving legal issues of property ownership.Conclusion: The forced and voluntary migration of local residents from Zoorabad significantly altered the demographic and agricultural landscape of the region. As a critical border area with historical disputes, preserving the human population and agricultural activity was vital for asserting political sovereignty. Although the government's attempts to manage abandoned properties and support agricultural activities were initiated, factors like labor retention and motivation limited these interventions' success. The strategy to lease land to agricultural businesses and resolve property disputes indicates ongoing efforts to stabilize the region, although challenges still persist.
