Document Type : .

Authors

• saideh torab ¹
• Hasan Hazrati ²
• mohsen seraj ³

¹ "PhD student in the History of the Islamic Revolution"

² "Associate Professor of the Department of History and Islamic Civilization, University of Tehran"

³ "Assistant Professor of the Department of Islamic Revolution History, Institute for Islamic Revolution and Imam Khomeini Studies"

Abstract

Introduction
Iran's port and maritime facilities located along the coasts of Khuzestan and Bushehr, including Imam Khomeini Port, Mahshahr, and Khark Island, as well as the maritime route and Iran's vital economic lifeline—the Strait of Hormuz—were considered the most sensitive economic and communication zones during this period. Ensuring the security of these areas was so critical that it could be seen as another front against Iraq's escalating aggressions. As the war dragged on, the need for both parties to sustain oil exports grew more urgent. Iran was fully aware of the importance of oil revenues and sought to maintain and even increase oil exports through terminals on Lavan and Siri Islands. However, Iraq imposed significant pressures to cut off Iran's oil exports, aiming to force Iranian authorities into negotiations. These pressures were so intense that Iran's oil export terminal on Khark Island was temporarily unable to operate. Iraq's military disruptions severely impacted Iran's oil exports, making Iranian ports and shipping routes appear unsafe. Nevertheless, meeting wartime needs and covering war expenses were entirely dependent on the continued operation of ports and the restoration of maritime traffic to Iranian waters. The Ports and Maritime Organization (PMO), as the primary authority responsible for maritime transportation and safety, held full jurisdiction over all port and maritime affairs in the country. The organization's fleet had the necessary capabilities to fulfill a significant portion of operational and logistical maritime needs. Therefore, it became necessary for the PMO, in compliance with new directives issued by the armed forces, to implement structural changes and, based on wartime requirements, to allocate its fleet as well as its technical and specialized capabilities to support the war effort. This process required extensive coordination and even alterations to the organization’s usual operations and structure. Hence, questions arose regarding the reasons and methods for this collaboration, the quality of interaction between the PMO and the military forces, and the nature of adaptive changes within the organization’s responsibilities. Although the PMO continued to perform its primary role as the main authority managing maritime transportation, the crisis of war introduced new imperatives that required reexamining the legal roles and responsibilities of the PMO as well as the scope of adaptive changes in its wartime performance. Historical evidence underscores the crucial role of logistics in wars. Alongside other civilian maritime organizations, the PMO was obligated to meet the logistical demands of the war, although its interactions with the armed forces differed significantly. This study aims to identify and analyze the level of integration and coordination between various components of the PMO and other institutions involved in the war effort.
Materials & Methods
The approach of this study is grounded in data and based on the description and critical analysis of documents and records. Consequently, the method employed is archival and document-based. Additionally, the oral history of the Iran-Iraq War contains significant material relevant to the subject, including memoirs and interviews, which have been utilized as much as possible. One of the most important sources for this research is the extensive collections published by institutions directly involved in the war, such as the Ports and Maritime Organization, the Navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and later, the Navy of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. These publications provide valuable insights into the roles and operations of these institutions during the war and reveal many untold aspects of the conflict. Furthermore, many directives and meeting minutes issued by these institutions during the war, included as official documents in these collections, are critical for identifying various dimensions of the maritime conflict. These documents offer the opportunity to examine some of the most significant events of the Iran-Iraq War in the Persian Gulf from the perspective of the involved institutions and analyze their actions and performance during the conflict.
Discussion & Result
 The role of both Iran and Iraq as key producers and exporters of oil in the Persian Gulf turned the region into a second front, equally as critical as the land battles for both sides. Success in this domain meant superiority in oil production and export, thereby exerting pressure on the adversary. Oil revenues played a pivotal role in meeting the war's needs, significantly influencing domestic markets and fulfilling the population's requirements. Additionally, any disruption in maritime traffic would result in the rerouting of commercial and oil tankers elsewhere. For Iran, ensuring security along these routes was crucial to not only maintaining but also increasing the free flow of ships to Iranian ports and terminals in the Persian Gulf. To improve coordination with the country’s military and security institutions, the Ports and Maritime Organization of Iran established an operational headquarters during this period. The purpose of this headquarters was to manage crises at southern ports and ensure the continuity of ship traffic to Iranian ports. Subsequently, on October 10, 1980 (18 Mehr 1359), an emergency plan for controlling maritime traffic in the Persian Gulf was developed and issued by the Army’s 421st Combat Unit to manage crises and ensure the continuation of maritime activity. Another critical issue was creating suitable conditions for the free movement of ships. For shipowners, the duration of port stays was a determining factor. Additionally, a high number of waiting ships at ports not only caused doubts about the efficiency and organization of the ports but also required substantial compensation for shipowners for each additional day of docking. This issue was frequently observed at Iranian docks in the early stages of the war. Thus, a shared area of cooperation between military and civilian maritime organizations emerged: addressing these problems using the equipment, expertise, and skills of institutions such as the Ports and Maritime Organization, which could significantly mitigate such challenges.
For instance, during 1980-1981, due to the increased volume of ships at Abbas and Bushehr ports, the Ports and Maritime Organization was tasked with extending working hours for its personnel and implementing special scheduling for the entry and exit of ships and fishing boats. This allowed maximum utilization of loading and unloading capacities. Similarly, during military operations and construction projects necessary for the armed forces, the Ports and Maritime Organization played a vital role based on its experience and expertise. Many operational and logistical needs of the armed forces during major operations, such as the lifting of the Abadan siege, Martyr Safari, Ashkan, Morvarid, the reintegration of Imam Khomeini Port into maritime transportation, the emergency escort plan for convoys in the Persian Gulf, and countering growing threats to Iran’s largest oil terminal on Kharg Island, were met and delivered with the collaboration of institutions like the Ports and Maritime Organization. Iran’s interests rested on maintaining stability and ensuring the continuity of oil exports. At the same time, it was widely believed that targeting Iran’s oil facilities could weaken its military capabilities in two ways: first, by reducing military equipment and arms, and second, by creating economic difficulties for institutions and the populace. Given the significance of this matter, wherever discussions of wartime logistics and meeting operational needs arise, the presence of the Ports and Maritime Organization is invariably evident.
Conclusion        
The historiography of the Iran-Iraq War, compared to the broader historiography of contemporary Iranian history, represents a distinct and unique phenomenon. However, this very distinctiveness exposes it to several vulnerabilities. The diverse interpretations of the war have made uncovering the truth behind many events challenging, particularly as the war is so deeply intertwined with the Islamic Revolution that discussing the historiography of the war becomes a complex task. Numerous centers have been established under the banner of war studies or research, each focusing on analyzing operational or tactical war documents within their respective objectives. It is evident that achieving these goals is impossible without creating archives and collecting comprehensive war-related documents. However, while many strategic war documents remain unpublished, the limited available documents are often unprofessionally archived within these institutions. In some cases, no steps have been taken for their cataloging or review. As a result, despite nominal access, these collections are practically inaccessible to researchers and students. The proliferation of institutions claiming expertise in war historiography has led to a form of competition centered solely on hoarding documents, a phenomenon that can be described as "document monopoly." In a few cases, institutions involved in the Iran-Iraq War, such as the Ports and Maritime Organization, have systematically collected, identified, and reviewed relevant documents, producing highly comprehensive collections. However, even in these rare instances, the archives remain closed to researchers, with access to existing documents still restricted. These archives are only used for certain internal research projects. Thus, monopolization stands as one of the biggest obstacles to war historiography, making any critical research in various aspects of the war nearly impossible. As mentioned earlier, the multiplicity of narratives about the war, coupled with the entanglement of the war and the Islamic Revolution, has made providing straightforward, realistic, and unaltered accounts extremely difficult. The perspective that views the war and defense as sacred rather than political further complicates war historiography, as it makes any critical or impartial evaluation nearly impossible. This issue has placed the writing of war history under the monopoly and dominance of specific institutions. As a result, this research has not been immune to these challenges. Despite the central role of the Ports and Maritime Organization in this study, none of the documents and records in its archives were accessible. Consequently, alongside the limited research conducted on the history of ports and maritime affairs, the work was carried out by exploring collections such as the National Archives, the Center for War Studies and Research affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and the Organization for Sacred Defense Documentation and Records. However, the available documents in these centers were insufficient in quantity to meet the research needs, especially since, contrary to standard practices, no documents from the Ports and Maritime Organization had been transferred to the National Archives. To address this gap, an attempt was made to compensate by using regulations, directives, correspondence, and joint negotiations between institutions. Additionally, chronologies and calendars compiled by the Army and the IRGC proved helpful in this regard. Based on the collected information, the historical developments, the background of the Ports and Maritime Organization, and the specific crises it faced during the war-which necessitated structural changes and the adoption of new exigencies-were described

Keywords

• Iran-Iraq war
• the Port and Shipping Organization
• maritime logistics
• supply chain
• contingent behavior